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CASE NOTES
the easier it is to conceal a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Legislation has
been suggested to meet problems where there is a monopoly by a few
firms." That may well be the answer and it should be more effective than a
judicially evolved section 1 violation. The court in the instant case, by
clarifying the language of previous cases, has taken a strong step in solidify-
ing the usefulness of conscious parallelism, viz., it does not of itself con-
stitute conclusive proof of conspiracy but it is relevant evidence to be
weighed with other factors in the detection of an antitrust conspiracy.
EDWARD J. MCDERMOTT
Uniform Commercial Code—Statutory Construction—Additional Terms
in Acceptance or Confirmation.—Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett fg
Co.'—Plaintiff, a manufacturer of cellophane bags for packing vegetables,
ordered from the defendant some emulsion which serves as a cellophane
adhesive. The defendant acknowledged before sending the product, the
acknowledgment including a disclaimer of all warranties and guaranties.
Upon receiving the emulsion, the plaintiff found it to be non-adhesive for his
purposes, and brought suit for breach of warranty, whereupon the defendant
set up the disclaimer as a defense. The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found for the defendant, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. HELD: Section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code controls, and the written acknowledgment
was effective even though it materially altered the offer, where plaintiff,
knowing of the alteration, voiced no objection and accepted and used the
goods.
The law of acceptance prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code had been subjected to much criticism. At first, and for a considerable
period of time, it was certain that an acceptance varying the terms of the
offer constituted a rejection; 2 such acceptance could constitute a counter-
offer.6 However, even under these rules, "an acceptance which merely
requests a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invali-
dated unless the acceptance is made to depend on assent to the changed or
added terms."4
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to resolve
all doubts in this area. To this end, Section 2-2076 was incorporated into the
24 See articles supra note 15.
297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
2 Kehlor Flour Mills Co. v. Lindon	 Lindstroem, 230 Mass. 119, 119 N.E. 698
(1918) ; Saco-Lowell Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., 277 Fed. 349 (1st Cir. 1921).
a Kennedy v. Russell, 280 Mass. 510, 182 N.E. 834 (1932) ; Restatement, Contracts
60 (1932).
4 Restatement, Contracts § 62 (1932).
5 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-207 (1958) provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it
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Code. Under subsection (2) of this Section, the additional terms become
part of the contract. between merchants unless, (b), they materially alter it.
According to the Code, the additional terms which effect a material altera-
tion are not part of the contract, but there is a contract; the additional terms
merely being proposals for additions to the contract. Now the question
becomes, what significance has a proposal for an addition which materially
alters the offer? It is submitted that, under the Code, it has no significance
unless expressly accepted. The correct interpretation of the Code, as gleaned
from the Section as well as the Comments which follow, is that if the extra
terms materially alter the offer, they will not be included unless expressly
agreed to by the offeror. If, however, they are not so material, they will be
incorporated unless offeror notifies offeree that he objects.
'	 The principal case falls into this category, in that there were terms in
the acceptance which materially altered the offer; consequently, these addi-
tional terms did not become part of the contract. The rationale of the
decision in the principal case is somewhat ambiguous. Actually, the court
is holding "that a response which states a condition materially altering the
obligation solely to the disadvantage of the offeror is an 'acceptance . . .
expressly conditional on assent to the additional .. . terms.' "° In effect,
however, the court rejects Section 2-207 completely, and concludes that
defendant's acceptance did not create a contract. It seems to assume that
the acceptance was a counteroffer and the ultimate contract was formed by
plaintiff's consent to defendant's offer, manifested by plaintiff's silent ac-
ceptance of the goods. This is the reasoning of the common law.7 It is
submitted that the court did not come to grips with the problem as it now
exists under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The argument concerning the issue of the inclusion or non-inclusion of
the additional terms centers around the Code comments. Defendant re-
lies on Comment 6,8 while plaintiff relies on Comment 3.9 The court
ignores Comment 3 as unreasonable. When read in context, however,
Comment 6 is parenthetical to Comment 5 and Section 2-207, both of
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it;
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
e 297 F.2d at 500.
7 Restatement, Contracts § 72 (1932).
8 Comment 6 to UCC § 2-207: "If no answer is received within a reasonable time
after additional terms are proposed, it is both fair and commercially sound to assume
that their inclusion has been assented to. . ."
9 Comment 3 to UCC § 2-207: "Whether or not additional or different terms will
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they
are such as materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be included unless
expressly agreed to by the other party. . ."
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which involve clauses of no unreasonable surprise (i.e., which do not
materially alter the offer), and which are, therefore, to be included in
the contract. Comment 6 directs itself to this type of fact situation. But
the present case involves additions which materially alter the . 6ffer, and it is
to this situation that Comment 3 pertains. An intelligent reading of the
Comment and, more importantly, of the statute itself leads to a result
diametrically opposite from that reached •by the court. The court in the
principal case reaches the anomalous result that, regardless of the fact that
the additional terms do materially alter the offer, they also become a part
of the contract, even though they were not expressly accepted. The court
stated: "If plaintiff's contention is correct that a reply to an offer stating
additional conditions unilaterally burdensome upon the offeror is a binding
acceptance of the original offer plus simply a proposal for the additional con-
ditions, the statute would lead to an absurdity." 14 It is submitted that this
is simply not so.
The court believes that it is too much of a burden for an .offeree
expressly to condition his acceptance on assent by the offeror to the addi-
tional terms. The court is wary of the situation where, as in the principal
case, the offeree accepts but adds terms which materially alter the offer, 11
As aformentioned, unless he has expressly conditioned his acceptance on
assent by the offeror to the additional terms, the result is that he is now
bound to a contract which does not include his additional terms, a result
he may not have intended at all. But surely, forcing the offeree to take the
simple precaution of using language explicitly conditioning his acceptance
on the offeror's assent to the additional terms is not imposing an unreason-
able burden on him. It is, in fact, a small price to pay for enabling
merchants in the business of buying and selling goods to know exactly where
they stand. And, it is to this end that the Uniform Commercial Code is, in
part at least, aimed.
STEPHEN J. PARIS
1 ° 297 F.2d at 500.
11 Obviously the court is not concerned with the situation in which the additional
terms do not materially alter the offer, for in that situation, under, subsection (1), the
additional terms become part of the contract unless the offeror expressly rejects it.
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